

# **PREVENT Policy and Guidance**

**Southend Safeguarding Adults Board  
Essex Safeguarding Adults Board  
Thurrock Safeguarding Adults Board**

**Southend Safeguarding Children Board  
Essex Safeguarding Children Board  
Thurrock Safeguarding Children Board**



April 2019  
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## Document Control Sheet

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| <b>Title:</b>                         | PREVENT policy and guidance   |
| <b>Purpose:</b>                       | A guide for local partnerships and agencies in Southend Essex and Thurrock in preventing radicalisation   |
| <b>Type:</b>                          | Operational policy and guidance   |
| <b>Target Audience:</b>               | All professionals working in Southend, Essex and Thurrock   |
| <b>Date approved:</b>                 | April 2019  |
| <b>Review Date:</b>                   | April 2020  |
| <b>This replaces:</b>                 | n/a   |
| <b>This should be read alongside:</b> | This Policy is compliant with all relevant legislation at the time of publication and adheres to the current SET Safeguarding Adults Guidelines and SET Safeguarding and Child Protection Procedures. |
| <b>Leads / Authors:</b>               | Sophie Scollen, Essex County Council (ECC)  |

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## 1.0. Policy


### 1.1. Introduction

CONTEST is the overall UK strategy for Countering Terrorism, it was recently updated in June 2018. The aim of CONTEST is to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence. It has four work streams, of which PREVENT is one. The purpose of the Prevent Strategy is to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.

To safeguard and support those vulnerable to radicalisation, to stop them from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism, we will:

- Focus our activity and resources in those locations where the threat from terrorism and radicalisation is highest.
- Expand our Desistance and Disengagement Programme with an immediate aim over the next 12 months to more than double the number of individuals receiving rehabilitative interventions.
- Develop a series of multi-agency pilots to trial methods to improve our understanding of those at risk of involvement in terrorism and enable earlier intervention.
- Focus our online activity on preventing the dissemination of terrorist material and building strong counter-terrorist narratives in order to ensure there are no safe places for terrorists online.
- Build stronger partnerships with communities, civil society groups, public sector institutions and industry to improve Prevent delivery.
- Re-enforce safeguarding at the heart of Prevent to ensure our communities and families are not exploited or groomed into following a path of violent extremism.

#### CONTEST's Risk Reduction Model



The objectives of Prevent are:

- Tackle the causes of radicalisation and respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism.
- Safeguard and support those most at risk of radicalisation through early intervention, identifying them and offering support.
- Enable those who have already engaged in terrorism to disengage and rehabilitate.

For further information see [Prevent Duty Guidance for England and Wales](#)

Channel is a key element of the Prevent strategy. It is a multi-agency approach to protect people at risk from radicalisation. Channel uses existing collaboration between local authorities, statutory partners (such as the education and health sectors, social services, children's and youth services and offender management services), the police and the local community to:

- Identify individuals at risk of being drawn into terrorism;
- Assess the nature and extent of that risk;
- Develop the most appropriate support plan for the individuals concerned.

Participation in Channel is entirely voluntary.

For further information see [Channel Duty Guidance for England and Wales](#)

## **1.2. Definitions**

These definitions are taken from the HM Government Prevent Strategy 2011.

- Radicalisation is defined as the process by which people come to support terrorism and extremism and, in some cases, to then participate on terrorist activity.
- Extremism is vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of the armed forces.

## **1.3. Information Sharing**

Information sharing must be assessed on a case-by-case basis and is governed by legislation. To ensure the rights of individuals are fully protected, it is important that information sharing agreements are in place at a local level. When considering sharing personal information, the specified authority should take account of the following:

- **Necessity and proportionality:** personal information should only be shared where it is strictly necessary to the intended outcome and proportionate to it. Key to de-

termining the necessity and proportionality of sharing information will be the professional judgement of the risks to an individual or the public;

- Consent: wherever possible the consent of the person concerned should be obtained before sharing any information about them;
- Power to share: the sharing of data by public sector bodies requires the existence of a power to do so, in addition to satisfying the requirements of the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Human Rights Act 1998; Data Protection Act and the Common Law Duty of Confidentiality: in engaging with non-public bodies, the specified authority should ensure that they are aware of their own responsibilities under the Data Protection Act and any confidentiality obligations that exist.

There may be some circumstances where specified authorities, in the course of Prevent related work, identify someone who may already be engaged in illegal terrorist-related activity. People suspected of being involved in such activity must be referred to the police. For guidance on information sharing speak with your manager in the first instance.

#### **1.4. Recording**

Your organisations case management and recording policies should be followed in respect of Prevent casework.

## **2.0. Guidance**

### **2.1. Channel Panel Process**

The role of the multi-agency panel is to develop an appropriate support package to safeguard those at risk of being drawn into terrorism based on an assessment of their vulnerability. The panel is responsible for managing the safeguarding risk which is in line with other multi-agency panels where risk is managed, such Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA).

The panel should be chaired by the local authority Prevent lead (see Annex B for local authority contact details) and include the Essex Police and other relevant statutory partners.

Channel is not a process for gathering intelligence. It is a process for providing support to people at risk. In common with other such programmes, it does require the sharing of personal information to ensure that the full range of an individual's vulnerabilities are identified and addressed. Information sharing must be assessed on a case by case basis and is governed by legislation.

It is not the purpose of Channel to provide an alternative to the criminal justice system for those who have been engaged in illegal activity. Channel is about early intervention to protect and divert people away from the risk they may face before illegality relating to terrorism occurs. Therefore, in line with other safeguarding processes, being referred to Channel will not lead to an individual receiving a criminal record as a consequence of the referral, nor as a result of any support they may receive through Channel.

### **2.2. Assessing Vulnerability**

Channel assesses vulnerability using a consistently applied vulnerability assessment framework built around three dimensions:

- Engagement with a group, cause or ideology;
- Intent to cause harm;
- Capability to cause harm.

The dimensions are considered separately as experience has shown that it is possible to be engaged without intending to cause harm and that it is possible to intend to cause harm without being particularly engaged. Experience has also shown that it is possible to desist (stop intending to cause harm) without fully disengaging (remaining sympathetic to the cause); though losing sympathy with the cause (disengaging) will invariably result in desistance (loss of intent).

The three dimensions are assessed by considering 22 factors that can contribute to vulnerability (13 associated with engagement, 6 that relate to intent and 3 for capa-

bility). These factors taken together form a rounded view of the vulnerability of an individual that will inform decisions on whether an individual needs support and what kind of support package may be appropriate. These factors can also be added to and are not considered an exhaustive list. By undertaking regular vulnerability assessments the progress that is being made in supporting an individual can be tracked through changes in the assessment.

### **2.3. Identifying Vulnerable People**

Completing a full assessment for all 22 factors requires thorough knowledge of the individual that may not be available at the point of the initial referral (see Vulnerable to Radicalisation (VTR) Referral Form at Annex A). However, there are a number of behaviours and other indicators that may indicate the presence of these factors.

Example indicators that an individual is engaged with an extremist group, cause or ideology include:

- Spending increasing time in the company of other suspected extremists;
- Changing their style of dress or personal appearance to accord with the group;
- Their day-to-day behaviour becoming increasingly centred around an extremist ideology, group or cause;
- Loss of interest in other friends and activities not associated with the extremist ideology, group or cause;
- Possession of material or symbols associated with an extremist cause (e.g. The swastika for far right groups);
- Attempts to recruit others to the group/cause/ideology.
- Communications with others that suggest identification with a group/cause/ideology.

Example indicators that an individual has an intention to use violence or other illegal means include:

- Clearly identifying another group as threatening what they stand for and blaming that group for all social or political ills;
- Using insulting or derogatory names or labels for another group;
- Speaking about the imminence of harm from the other group and the importance of action now;
- Expressing attitudes that justify offending on behalf of the group, cause or ideology;
- Condoning or supporting violence or harm towards others;
- Plotting or conspiring with others.

Example indicators that an individual is capable of contributing directly or indirectly to an act of terrorism include:

- Having a history of violence;
- Being criminally versatile and using criminal networks to support extremist goals;
- Having occupational skills that can enable acts of terrorism (such as civil engineering, pharmacology or construction); or
- Having technical expertise that can be deployed (e.g. IT skills, knowledge of chemicals, military training or survival skills).

The examples above are not exhaustive and vulnerability may manifest itself in other ways. There is no single route to terrorism nor is there a simple profile of those who become involved. For this reason, any attempt to derive a 'profile' can be misleading. It must not be assumed that these characteristics and experiences will necessarily lead to individuals becoming terrorists, or that these indicators are the only source of information required to make an appropriate assessment about vulnerability.

## **2.4. Consent**

People who are vulnerable to violent extremism or radicalisation are more likely to be reached by supportive services if issues of consent are handled with sensitivity and an informed understanding of the issues.

Before making a referral, practitioners should respond as we would to all concerns, by clarifying the information.

For children this will ordinarily involve talking to the child/young person and their family (unless the family is implicated in potential extremism), and to other professionals working with the child/young person. Any referral should be made with the young person/family's knowledge and consent, unless to do so would place the child/young person at risk of harm.

For adults (over 18 years old) practitioners should seek the consent of the person who may be at risk of extremism or radicalisation before taking action or sharing information. In some cases, where a person refuses consent, information can still lawfully be shared if it is in the public interest to do so. This may include protecting someone from serious harm or preventing crime and disorder.

When there are grounds to doubt the capacity of those aged 16 and over steps need to be taken to provide support to enable an informed decision is made whether to consent to work with the Channel Panel. Please refer to the [Mental Capacity Act 2005](#) for further information.

As a voluntary programme, no Social Care work can take place without the agreement and engagement of the adult.

Any practitioner who is in doubt about whether or not they should share information, or whether they have consent either to share information or carry out a piece of work, should consult the above guidance, or consult their line manager or Prevent Lead. Advice on information sharing can also be sought from the Information Governance Team in their Authority. Any worker who believes a crime is being committed, or planned, or is aware of any terrorist activity, should contact Essex Police without delay.

## **2.5. Referral Process**

Any agency or member of the public can make a referral to Channel. Staff need to consider however, their local safeguarding procedures in the first instance and whenever a vulnerable to radicalisation risk is of concern, they should consult with the Prevent/Safeguarding Leads within their organisation. Prevent/Safeguarding Leads should support in making the decision as to whether a referral to Channel Panel is needed and if this is the appropriate route.

Referrals should be made without delay, where there are concerns about significant harm or directly to the Police on 999 if there is an imminent risk of harm.

A referral form, which is also known as person vulnerable to radicalisation (VTR), can be requested from your local Prevent contacts (see Annex B)

Once completed, this should be returned securely to: [Prevent@essex.pnn.police.uk](mailto:Prevent@essex.pnn.police.uk) (Secure emails are nhs.net, .pnn, cjsm, .gsi or a secure system such as Egross)

If you do not have a secure email you can set the security on the referral with a password and ring 01245 452196 (Police Prevent Team) to let them know the referral has been sent and the password to open it.

Any referral received will initially be screened. All cases that progress through the Channel process will be subject to a thorough assessment of vulnerabilities in a multi-agency safeguarding environment.

The preliminary assessment is co-ordinated and should be informed by multi-agency information gathering and can include consideration of an initial vulnerability assessment. The referrer and any identified relevant agency working with the individual is required to attend the Channel Panel meeting if the case is heard.

At this point partners should collectively assess the risk and decide whether the person:

- Is vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism and therefore appropriate for Channel;
- Should be referred to a different support mechanism; or
- Should exit the process.

In assessing the risk, consideration should be given to:


- The risk the individual faces of being drawn into terrorism; and
- The risk the individual poses to society.

In some cases a Channel referral will exit the process at this stage and be signposted to those support services most appropriate to their needs. If there are concerns that the person is suffering or likely to suffer significant harm, a referral to Children's or Adult Social Care must be made, this will be discussed and determined who will raise this before the case exits the process. If there are no concerns or low risk but the person requires additional support, a referral may be made for Common Assessment Framework and Early Help.

## **2.6. Transfer arrangements**

Transfer arrangements need to be discussed and decided by the Channel Panel chairs of the county the case is leaving and the county the case is moving to. They need to decide where the case sits and factor in how long the move is likely to be for.

## 2.7. Referral Flowchart



## **2.8. Risk and Intervention Process**

The multi-agency panel using their professional expertise will develop a support package. This will be based on a review of the vulnerability assessment completed by the Essex Police Prevent team at the preliminary assessment stage, the needs of the individual and any risks posed to potential support providers.

Risk is a theme that runs through the entire Channel process: risk to the individual; risk to the public; and risk to statutory partners and any intervention providers.

Multi-agency panel members should consider sharing any further information with each other for the purposes of Channel, subject to a case-by-case assessment of necessity, proportionality and lawfulness.

Wherever possible, the informed consent of the individual (and their family / carers) should be obtained. The panel may conclude that the individual is better suited to alternative support mechanisms or that further assessment indicates that the individual is not vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. In such cases the Chair of the panel is responsible for confirming the recommendation and ensuring that the decision is properly recorded.

If the panel consider that support to reduce vulnerability of being drawn into terrorist-related activity is required, they should devise an appropriate support package. This should take the form of a support plan setting out details of the statutory or community partners who will lead on delivery of the support. Consideration must also be given to potential risks posed to the provider of any support package. The action plan should highlight identified behaviours and risks that need to be addressed. This will assist in case reviews and evaluating the effectiveness of the support package. All decisions should be properly recorded.

Responses to those who are at risk from involvement in violent extremism are more likely to be effective if they are delivered at an early stage and at the lowest level of intervention. For this reason, it is important to understand the signs, and to be able to engage people effectively. It is anticipated that each Authorities Social Care service, will provide effective, whole family based interventions, but the thresholds for higher level interventions must also be understood, and applied where appropriate.

The type of activities that are included in a support package will depend on risk, vulnerability and local resource. To illustrate, a diversionary activity may be sufficient for someone who is in the early stages of radicalisation whereas a more focussed and structured one-on-one mentoring programme may be required for those who are already radicalised.

The following kinds of support might be considered appropriate:

- Life skills - work on life skills or social skills generally, such as dealing with peer pressure;
- Mentoring support contact - work with a suitable adult as a role model or providing personal guidance, including guidance addressing extremist ideologies;
- Anger management session - formal or informal work dealing with anger;
- Cognitive/behavioural contact - cognitive behavioural therapies and general work on attitudes and behaviours;
- Constructive pursuits - supervised or managed constructive leisure activities;
- Education skills contact - activities focused on education or training;
- Careers contact - activities focused on employment;
- Family support contact - activities aimed at supporting family and personal relationships, including formal parenting programmes;
- Health awareness contact - work aimed at assessing or addressing any physical or mental health issues;
- Housing support contact - activities addressing living arrangements, accommodation provision or neighbourhood; and
- Drugs and alcohol awareness - substance misuse interventions.

Community or non-statutory partners providing support to vulnerable people need to be credible with the vulnerable individual concerned and to understand the local community. They have an important role and their reliability, suitability to work with vulnerable people and commitment to shared values needs to be established. Multi-agency panels should make the necessary checks to be assured of the suitability of support providers; including checks to the Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) for those seeking to work with children, young people and adults.

If the panel is satisfied that the risk has been successfully reduced or managed they should recommend that the case exits the process. This is noted in the minutes. The recommendations will need to be endorsed by the Chair of the panel and Essex Police Prevent lead.

If the panel is not satisfied that the risk has been reduced or managed the case should be reconsidered. A new support plan should be developed and alternative support put in place. If the risk of criminality relating to terrorism has increased the Essex Police Prevent team must consider escalating the case through existing police mechanisms and whether the case remains suitable for the Channel process.

All open cases are reviewed at every panel until the point at which they exit the process, using the vulnerability assessment framework. All decisions and actions should be fully recorded in the minutes of the meeting.

## **2.9. Working with Partner Agencies**

Home Office 2015 Prevent Guidance places a specific duty on local authorities to cooperate with all partners to support and complement their work. It is vital that all Social Care staff adopt a collaborative and co-operative multi-agency approach. Strategic and management arrangements are being developed to support practitioners in their duty to work in partnership.

Key partners include: Essex Police, especially their Prevent Team; Social Care Adults and Children; Youth Offending Services, Probation agencies, Prisons and YOIs; Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services, Adult Mental Health Services; Early Help services; Community Safety Officers; all usual health and education colleagues including colleges and universities; and the full range of community and voluntary organisations, especially youth and faith organisations.

Schools and some voluntary organisations are often best placed to identify emerging concerns. This places an additional duty of vigilance upon them, and they have specific support requirements. Keeping Children Safe in Education (DfE, 2015) says that protecting children from the risk of radicalisation should be seen as part of schools' wider safeguarding duties.

If an organisation is asked to provide information to the Channel Panel or Prevent Multi-Agency group it is your responsibility to respond within a set time frame outlined by the Prevent chair and/or administrator. It is also the organisations responsibility to notify the Channel Panel of relevant changes in circumstances or provide an update on progress/intervention.

## **2.10. Channel Panels**

Channel Panels oversee and co-ordinate Prevent interventions in Essex, Southend and Thurrock. The panel has a statutory basis: under the terms of the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015, local authorities must:

- Ensure a multi-agency panel exists and chair the panel
- Use the panel to develop a support plan for accepted cases and signpost to other support where cases are not accepted
- Ensure consent is sought prior to support being provided
- Co-operate with other panel partners

(South East Counter Terrorism Unit 2015)

Membership: The Channel Panel meets on a monthly basis in Essex and where needed in Thurrock and Southend. Permanent members will include Social Care (Adult and Children), and Essex Police Prevent team. Other agencies will be invited depending on need.

## 2.11. Case Management, Recording, Supervision and Support

Case management & recording Social Care case management and recording policies should be followed in respect of Prevent casework.

Supervision & support Social Care supervision policies should be followed. The existing research into Prevent casework acknowledges the complexity of the issues around: maintaining consent and trust when dealing with complex and highly emotive issues, delivering help to families where there may be either pressure or a need to monitor and report back, balancing human rights and individual liberties against the risk of harm, operating as a confident and challenging practitioner in a politically charged environment, & understanding cultural issues.

## 2.12. Training

The Home Office will be procuring a new supplier to support the delivery of the Prevent training strategy over the next three years and replace WRAP. Once a replacement has been confirmed it will be publicised here.

The current eLearning packages are accessible and available here:

<http://www.elearning.prevent.homeoffice.gov.uk>

<https://www.elearning.prevent.homeoffice.gov.uk/preventreferrals>

<https://www.elearning.prevent.homeoffice.gov.uk/channelawareness>

## Annex A

A Vulnerable to Radicalisation referral form can be found [here](#) or by contacting [Prevent@essex.gov.uk](mailto:Prevent@essex.gov.uk)

## Annex B – PREVENT and CHANNEL leads/administrators

| Organisation         | Name                               | Job title/role  | Email  |
|----------------------|------------------------------------|---|--|
| Essex County Council | Trevor Willis                      | Prevent Lead<br><br>Chair of Prevent Multi-agency group<br><br>Chair of Essex Channel Panel | <a href="mailto:Trevor.willis@essex.gov.uk">Trevor.willis@essex.gov.uk</a> |
| Essex County Council | Essex County Council Prevent inbox | PREVENT coordination  | <a href="mailto:Prevent@essex.gov.uk">Prevent@essex.gov.uk</a>             |

|  |                             |   |  |
|--|-----------------------------|---|--|
| Essex County Council                                 | Jo Barclay                  | Education Lead  | <a href="mailto:Jo.Barclay@essex.gov.uk">Jo.Barclay@essex.gov.uk</a>   |
| Essex Police (covering Southend, Essex and Thurrock) |                             | Essex PREVENT Engagement Officers   | <a href="mailto:prevent@essex.pnn.police.uk">prevent@essex.pnn.police.uk</a>   |
| Eastern Region Special Operations Unit               | Kay Laney                   | Prevent Sergeant for Essex, Suffolk and Norfolk                           | <a href="mailto:Kay.Laney@suffolk.pnn.police.uk">Kay.Laney@suffolk.pnn.police.uk</a>   |
| Southend-on-Sea Borough Council                      | Carl Robinson               | Chair of Southend PREVENT Board<br>Interim Director for Public Protection | <a href="mailto:CarlRobinson@southend.gov.uk">CarlRobinson@southend.gov.uk</a>   |
| Southend-on-Sea Borough Council                      | Alison Crowe and Lynn Scott | Co-Chairs of Southend Channel Panel                                       | <a href="mailto:AlisonCrowe@southend.gov.uk">AlisonCrowe@southend.gov.uk</a><br><a href="mailto:Lynnscott@southend.gov.uk">Lynnscott@southend.gov.uk</a> |
| Thurrock Council                                     | Carol Hinvest               | Prevent Board chair   | <a href="mailto:CHinvest@thurrock.gov.uk">CHinvest@thurrock.gov.uk</a>   |
| Thurrock Council                                     | Fran Leddra                 | Chair of Thurrock Channel Panel   | <a href="mailto:fleddra@thurrock.gov.uk">fleddra@thurrock.gov.uk</a>   |
| Thurrock Council                                     | Jason Read                  | Vice Chair of Thurrock Channel Panel                                      | <a href="mailto:jread@thurrock.gov.uk">jread@thurrock.gov.uk</a>   |

## 2.13. References

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-terrorism-strategy-contest-2018>

[https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/425189/Channel\\_Duty\\_Guidance\\_April\\_2015.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/425189/Channel_Duty_Guidance_April_2015.pdf)

<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/9/contents>

<http://www.essexsab.org.uk/media/2278/vtr-essex-mar-19.docx>

<https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/prevent-training-competencies-framework-v3.pdf>